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TAX EQUITY AND HOMELESSNESS:
A TAX POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE GOLDEN REPORT
GRAHAM WEBB*
When you drive around and you see homeless people lying on the
street, sleeping in bus shelters, it just turns your stomach that this is
happening in this rich city. We need to find solutions.
-Mayor Mel LastmanI
RItSUMik
Un groupe de travail sur les sans-abri a 6t form6 par la Ville de Toronto en reponse
A une crise du logement perque par la population. Une enquete approfondie sur les
causes du probl~me des sans-abri et les moyens d'y rem6dier a 6t6 men~e, et on a
conclu que la situation est surtout attribuable A un 6cart de revenu toujours plus grand
entre riches et pauvres, le cofit 61ev6 du logement et le manque d'habitations sociales
subventionn~es ot le loyer est fonction du revenu. Les membres du groupe de travail
ont recommand6 la creation d'un nouveau programme d'allocation pour le logement
financ6 par la province et le r&ablissement du financement par le gouvemement
f~d~ral des cofits d'immobilisation relies aux habitations sociales.
Une analyse de la politique fiscale r6v~le que des avantages fiscaux importants sont
consentis A 1'6gard des logements occup~s par leur propri6taire, ce qui entraine des
in~galit6s entre les propri~taires et les locataires. Le syst-me d'imposition devrait
61liminer ces in6galit~s en taxant les propri~taires sur les gains en capital provenant de
la vente d'une r6sidence principale et en imposant une taxe sur les revenus de location
tires des immeubles r~sidentiels occup~s par leur propriftaire. Idalement, une mesure
d'imposition permettant de compenser pour le manque A gagner qui r6sulte de
l'absence d'imp6t sur ces revenus apporterait une reponse generale plus adequate au
probl~me grandissant de la pauvret6, dont la crise du logement n'est qu'un sympt6me.
Une r6forme de la fiscalit6 aussi radicale est quasi impossible sur le plan politique,
mais les effets des recommandations contenues dans le Golden Report se rapproche-
raient de ceux que produirait le minimum de modifications fiscales n~cessaire pour
61iminer les in~galit~s entre propri~taires et locataires et repr~sentent une solution
fiscale tr~s valable en vue d'am~liorer le r6gime actuel.
Graham Webb, LL.B., LL.M., staff litigation lawyer, Advocacy Centre for the Elderly, Toronto.
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1. Anne Golden (Chair), William H. Currie, Elizabeth Greaves, et al., Taking Responsibility for
Homelessness: An Action Plan for Toronto, Report of the Mayor's Homelessness Action Task Force
(Toronto: City of Toronto, 1999) at 13 (marginal note).
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I. THE COMPELLING OBLIGATION OF HUMANITY
A. A New Responsibility in a New Millennium
In January 1999 the Report of the Mayor's Homelessness Action Task Force (hereafter
called the Golden Report) was issued, recommending significant direct-spending
programs through provincial shelter allowances, 2 and federal funding for the capital
costs of social housing.3
In March 1999 the Government of Canada announced the appointment of the Minister
of Labour Claudette Bradshaw to a new and additional cabinet responsibility as
Co-ordinator on Homelessness. The Minister has a long record of public service for
the poor and disadvantaged, and some expertise in the social policy issues related to
homelessness. Her credentials allow no doubt about her experience and good inten-
tions, yet her new responsibility has not yet restored federal funding of new social
housing for young low-income families, nor the creation of any other long-term policy
instrument that would reduce or eliminate homelessness.
One hopes that this appointment signals the focus of attention of the Government of
Canada, and the Province of Ontario, on the plight of the homeless to the extent that
the type of long-term direct-spending programs advocated by the Golden Report will
soon be delivered. From a tax-policy perspective, the housing subsidies recommended
by the Golden Report have considerable merit and are worth serious attention from
both senior levels of government.
B. The Case for Housing Subsidies
There is no greater need than from shelter, especially for the young, the old, the infirm,
and the -vulnerable in Canada. Our very climate transforms the need for adequate
housing from an abstraction to a concrete reality. The Qu6becois songwriter Gilles
Vigneault aptly wrote, "Mon pays, ce n 'est pas un pays, c 'est l'hiver,"'4 (last modified
2001). and in fact our ability to cope with cold, harsh, and unforgiving winters does
help define us all as Canadians. The general importance of good housing to Canadians
was highlighted by Elmer McKay, then federal minister of public works, who said in
debate on 1992 amendments to the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation Act
and the National Housing Act, "[T]here is nothing more important to Canadians in
general than the state of their housing,"' 5 and it is hard to disagree.
Homelessness is a tear in the social fabric. There can be no greater tear in the fabric
of our nation than when large numbers of Canadians-our children, our elders, our
neighbours-find themselves homeless. Should we fail to repair the fabric we will
2. Ibid at 77-85.
3. Ibid. at 152-53.
4. Gilles Vigneault, "Mon Pays" in Gilles Vigneault (sound recording) (Don Mills, Ont.: Sony Music
Canada Inc., 1972 [vinyl], re-released 1991 [C.D.]). This may be translated as "My country, it is not
a country, it is the winter." See AltaVista World Translations, online: <http://babelfish.altavista.
com/translate.dyn
5. House of Commons Debates (15 June 1992) at 12086.
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inescapably be rent apart, divided in proportions as "haves" and "have nots." Such
profound social division is inconsistent with the vision of an egalitarian democracy.
To echo the words of Henry Simons, who considered the prevailing distribution of
wealth to be intrinsically evil and esthetically displeasing, homelessness in Canada is
also "distinctly evil or unlovely."'6 On a purely ethical and esthetic basis, homelessness
is simply a phenomenon that most Canadians would prefer not to have in our own
nation, much less in our own communities.
The economic case for housing subsidies is not the focus of the present enquiry, but
it is briefly necessary as a foundation for the tax analysis to follow. Jurists and
economists have turned their minds to housing as one aspect of poverty and considered
whether the best social policy would be to direct subsidies to affordable housing as a
discrete commodity, or rather to address the underlying issue of income distribution
in general. Greg Mason presented a paper on housing access and affordability to a
1995 Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) symposium on housing
affordability, and captured the debate as follows:
Analysts can be divided into two general groups... First there are neo-classical
economists who argue that housing should be treated like any other commodity. In
this view consumer preferences are constrained by a budget. The outcome of this
decision-making framework results in an optimum combination of housing and all
other goods. This perspective has much to recommend it. Housing affordability is
not an issue;.income adequacy is. Rather than creating housing, poor people should
get money, or better yet, the skills to earn higher incomes. The resolution to any
problem is through income re-distribution and not through direct intervention into a
specific market ... Few economists subscribe to this view. For most, housing is a
merit good and the state has an obligation to intervene in the market. .. 7
In the same vein, Michael Schill, in a review of American public-housing policy
queried why governments should make direct interventions in the housing market
rather than addressing the underlying problem of poverty where "elementary welfare
economics would indicate that an unrestricted income supplement such as a negative
income tax [that would generally alleviate poverty with respect to all commodities]
would be the most efficient policy."8 However, Schill supported the opposite view,
that there should be direct intervention in housing markets. He pointed out that
although "housing markets are generally competitive," 9 and therefore ought to
respond with adequate supply if the demand for low-income housing were increased,
there are significant market imperfections that call for direct market intervention.
6. Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938) at 18-19,
as follows: "The case for drastic progression in taxation must be rested on the case against inequal-
ity--on the ethical or aesthetic judgment that the prevailing distribution of wealth and income
reveals a degree (and/or kind) of inequality which is distinctly evil or unlovely."
7. Greg Mason, Housing a Diverse Society: Access and Affordability Issues for Canada (Winnipeg:
Prairie Research Associates Inc. & Department of Economics, University of Manitoba, 1995) at 7.
8. Michael H. Schill, "Privatizing Federal Low-Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Hous-
ing" (1990) 75 Cornell L. Rev. 878 at 890.
9. Ibid.
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There can be an imbalance between long-term and short-term market equilibriums that
may leave renters homeless in the short term, even where long-term market equilib-
rium is predicted.10 Schill also stated that "government regulation impedes the supply
of housing, especially for low-income households."11 Quoting James Tobin, he noted
that "although most Americans typically accept inequality in most aspects of life, there
is a rough consensus that 'certain scarce commodities should be distributed less
unequally than the ability to pay for them."' 12 On the distribution of housing for
children living in poverty, which is particularly salient to the present housing crisis in
Toronto, he noted that "efforts to provide a minimum level of housing consumption
may be justified as necessary to protect those who do not themselves have the power
to make expenditure housing decisions. ' 13
Early in the twentieth century, the economist A.C. Pigou also considered the problem
of low-income housing "as one aspect of the general problem of poverty"' 14 and,
casting aside the veil of welfare economics, he succinctly held that
everywhere... some system of standards should be set up, and the lapse below any
one of them should be made the occasion of intervention by the public authorities.
For this position a good defence can, in many instances, be made upon economy...
but even where this ground fails, the policy that I have sketched is amply main-
tained: for it is not more than the acceptance in fact of the compelling obligation of
humanity. ' 5
Pigou considered, in the context of his time, whether low-income housing should
receive subsidies, like education, or be left to the marketplace, like food and clothing.
He did not reach a conclusion, but tended to favour housing subsidies and was
"convinced that carefully drawn schemes of state assistance toward the housing of the
poor ought not to be condemned out of hand upon grounds of principle. They deserve,
if not support, at least sympathetic consideration." 16
Much water has passed under the bridge of social policy since Pigou's time. However,
universal access to adequate housing remains a timeless human obligation. The social
structures that have come to pass in Canada, particularly in income taxation and
corresponding public expenditures on housing, cause this author to think that the
social-policy issues that left Pigou sympathetic but undecided now mitigate unequiv-
10. Ibid. at 891, as follows: "The supply of housing, although quite elastic in the long run, is relatively
inelastic in the short run..
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. at 892, quoting James Tobin, "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality" (1970) 13 J. L. & Econ.
263 at 264.
13. Ibid. at 893.
14. A.C. Pigou, "Some Aspects of the Housing Problem" in B. Seebohm Rowntree and A.C. Pigou, eds.,
Lectures on Housing (1914; reprint, London: Garland Publishing, 1980) at 25.
15. Ibid. at 37.
16. Ibid. at 66.
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ocally in favour of increased program spending on social housing along the lines
suggested by the recently released Golden Report.
II. THE GOLDEN REPORT ON HOMELESSNESS
A. The Mayor's Homelessness Action Task Force
Mayor Mel Lastman of Toronto commissioned the Mayor's Homelessness Action Task
Force in January 1998, "in response to public concern about the growth of homeless-
ness and its increasing visibility on the streets of Toronto." 17 The task force conducted
an intensive and comprehensive study of issues surrounding homelessness,18 and
released its report in January 1999. The Golden Report recommends concrete, cost-
evaluated measures to combat homelessness in Toronto that are needed from the
federal, provincial, and municipal governments to bring immediate relief.19
The main task force recommendations on tax policy call for significant direct-spend-
ing programs by the provincial and federal governments in the area of social housing.
The scope and purpose of this paper is to consider the tax-policy implications of the
spending recommendations of the report.
B. The Causes of Homelessness
1. The Rich Are Getting Richer, and the Poor Are Getting Poorer
Poverty strikes at the heart of the distributional function that ought to be adequately
addressed in a well-designed income tax system. Yet the evidence is that in the City
of Toronto there is greater and more profound poverty than in the recent past. The
Mayor's Homelessness Action Task Force commissioned a study on trends in poverty
in the new City of Toronto,20 and the findings were remarkable.
Poverty is increasing, even during a time of economic growth, which is a departure
from earlier opposite trends that indicated poverty should recede in a growing
economy.2 1 Using the Statistics Canada "Low-Income Cut-Offs" (LICOs) as a proxy
for poverty lines, most low-income Canadians have fallen even further below the
poverty line in the past decade.22 The study found that "in 1995, the percentage of
households earning less than $20,000 in Toronto was 24.3% compared to 20.6% in
1990."'23 When one considers the cost of housing in Toronto, this alone is an astonish-
ing statistic.
17. Supra note 1 at 13.
18. Ibid. at 14-17 (on the task force's methodology).
19. See ibid. at 189-202 for a complete list of the report's 105 recommendations.
20. Michael Mendelson, Andy Mitchell, Mikael Swayze, et al., Trends in Poverty in the New City of
Toronto, Report prepared for the Mayor's Homelessness Action Task Force (Toronto: City of
Toronto, 1998).
21. Supra note 1 at 254 (Appendix H).
22. Ibid. at 255.
23. Ibid.
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Young families are more often poor. Since 1980 there has been a dramatic shift in the
incidence of poverty by age. In that time, poverty among families headed by someone
aged 65 or older has fallen from 21% to 9.2%. In the same time, poverty for families
headed by someone under age 25 has risen from 20.9% to 42.0%. The study concluded
that "young families have gotten poorer, families headed by someone middle-aged
have stayed about the same, and the situation for older families has improved. There
has been a similar shift by age group for unattached individuals. '24
The most profound effects are on families headed by single mothers, who are at
extreme risk of poverty. "In 1995, the poverty rate for families headed by a single'
mother under 25 years of age was 83%... between 25 and 44, the poverty rate was
57.4%... between 45 and 64 the rate was 38%."25 These findings on poverty among
families headed by single mothers are impossible to ignore, particularly in view of the
arguments for the inclusion of imputed income together with a negative income tax,
which will follow.
Renters are losing ground relative to homeowners. "Poverty rates [for families who
rent] have reached a new high of 36.2% in 1996, at a time of economic growth. The
incidence of poverty among homeowners -was 7.2% in 1996."26
Recent changes to income-security programs have exacerbated poverty. Federal
employment insurance adopted more restrictive eligibility criteria in 1996, forcing
more of the unemployed onto provincial social-assistance programs. In 1995 Ontario
also restricted eligibility criteria and cut benefits to social assistance programs by
21.6%. Thus the poorest of the poor, drawing on the income security programs of last
resort, have suffered a significant loss of income.27
2. The High Cost of Homeownership
The perception of the high cost of homeownership is one shared by rich and poor alike.
Residential housing in Canada has a high capital cost, particularly in relation to the
earnings of young families. One tax planner introduced a discussion on how to assist
children in purchasing a home at the 1996 Canadian Tax Foundation annual conference
with the following observations:
One of our persistent concerns is that our children will not be able to enjoy the
material things that we have enjoyed. We see university graduates working at sub-
sistence-level jobs; we hear of the stiff competition for acceptance in programs to
provide skills that command reasonable earnings; we perceive a replacement of
high-paying jobs with more menial employment and the replacement of middle
management with technology. At the same time we consider unbelievable the cost
of capital items such as cars and homes. We value the positive social elements we
perceive to come with homeownership and desire that our children enjoy these also.
24. Ibid. at 256.
25. Ibid. at 256-57.
26. Ibid. at 257-58.
27. Ibid. at 259-60.
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As well, we look at homes as good investments and believe that increases in their
values will keep pace with, and probably exceed, the rate of inflation. With house
prices increasing and our perception of a weak job market, how will our children
ever be able to put aside the funds needed for a down payment?28
If the accumulation of a down payment is perceived to be so difficult for the children of
the middle-class and the well-to-do, one might wonder how much more difficult and
impractical will that be for the disabled, the unemployed, the underemployed, and the
working poor. Without an intergenerational wealth transfer, or some other family support,
a substantial income would be required to make a home purchase possible. The practical
effect may be to exclude the working poor from the owner-occupied housing market, and
that conclusion would be consistent with the evidence revealed in the Golden Report.
3. The Unmet Demand for Social Housing
The Golden Report found that in June 1998 there was a huge unmet demand of "more
than 37,000 households, representing about 100,000 people ... waiting for social
housing in Toronto. ' '2 9 In hindsight, this should hardly be surprising. In 1992, Joe
Fontana, then Opposition housing critic, said in debate on amendments to the Canada
Mortgage and Housing Corporation Act and the National Housing Act,
currently only 6 percent of Canadians are served by social housing programs. There
are 15 percent or more, over one million Canadians, 30 who are still in core housing
need. Despite such overwhelming need, the federal government has consistently cut
social housing programs in consecutive budgets.
The most recent budget will amount to a 50 percent reduction in the construc-
tion of new social housing units within three years. 31
Those facts were not disputed by the Minister, who was then in the House, and any
abatement of the unmet demand for social housing in that context would be virtually
unimaginable.
The profile of those on the waiting list for social housing has also changed, to include
more families and more children. In Toronto "there are more than 16,000 applicants
for social housing who have children. In all, more than 31,000 children are waiting
for social housing." 32 Families with children are at a high risk of homelessness and
are one of the fastest-growing groups in the use of hostels.3 3 Because of their need for
larger accommodations, families are also the most difficult to house.34
28. Hugh A. Gbrdon, "Helping Your Children Acquire a Home," in Report of Proceedings of the Forty-
Eighth Tax Conference: 1996 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1997) at 59:1.
29. Supra note 1 at 27.
30. Fontana did not state the source of his statistics, but based on the percentage he gave and census data
at the time in question, it seems that the figure of 1 million Canadians in core housing need may be a
significant understatement.
31. House of Commons Debates (15 June 1992) at 12092.
32. Supra note 1 at 28.
33. Ibid. at 49-51.
34. Ibid at 53-54.
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4. Cancellation of Funding to Build Social Housing
Prior to 1993, the Government of Canada funded capital costs for the construction of
social housing. In 1993 the federal government abruptly withdrew from funding new
social housing except for the elderly, the disabled, and members of First Nations. Most
provinces, including the province of Ontario, did not take up additional program
spending on new social housing, to the detriment of young poverty-stricken families
and all low-income renters.
C. The Golden Report Recommendations
The Golden Report found that the problem of homelessness is not insoluble, but does
require immediate action by all levels of government to achieve a resolution. The
Golden Report made 105 recommendations. 35 Recommendations that require addi-
tional government spending are evaluated on cost. Those under consideration here
are: (1) a new provincial shelter allowance for all working poor families at an
annual cost of $91 million, which, if feasible, should be extended to all working
adults at an estimated cost of $178 million; 36 and (2) new federal funding of the
capital cost of social housing, to the extent of $200 to $300 million nationwide, or
$40 to $60 million for Toronto.37
1. Provincial Shelter Allowances
The program design recommended by the Golden Report is a shelter allowance that
would be given to low-income families, aimed at reducing the percentage of family
income devoted to rent to a target of 35%.38 Up to 90% of the difference between 35%
of income and the actual percentage of income devoted to rent would be subsidized
on a sliding scale. This "35/90 formula" would operate as follows:
The "contribution rate" would be 35 percent, meaning that the tenant pays at least 35
percent of income on rent. The percentage of the affordability gap covered by the
benefit would range from a high of 90 percent (the allowance covers 90 percent of the
difference between 35 percent of income and the actual rent for households with incomes
of $10,000) to a low of 70 percent (for households with incomes of $30,000).39
35. Ibid. at 189-202.
36. Ibid. at 82-85, and recommendation 38 at 84, as follows: "A new shelter allowance program should
be created, targeted to working poor families as a first priority, and to working adults if feasible. The
aim of this program, which would require annual re-application, is to reduce the risk of homelessness
and to ensure that the transition from welfare to employment does not increase the risk of homeless-
ness. The shelter allowance program should reduce the share of income that low-income people
spend on housing to between 35 and 40 per cent."
37. Ibid. at 145-55, and recommendation 84 at 154.
38. Compare Peter W. Salsich, Jr., "Welfare Reform: Is Self Sufficiency Feasible without Affordable
Housing?" (1997) 2 Mich. L. & Policy Rev. 43 at 56, stating that "the affordability definition of the
Section 8 and public housing programs [is] that a person should not have to pay more than 30% of
his/her income for housing, including utilities." By comparison, the 35% ratio adopted by the Golden
Report is less generous to renters than comparable federal American program criteria.
39. Supra note 1 at 83.
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The recommended program design is intended to encourage tenants to seek lower-cost
housing by reimbursing less than the full differential between 35% of income and
actual housing costs. The graduated scale would target the program at those most in
need, while preventing "an abrupt loss of benefits or an inequity between those just
over and those just under the line."'40 It also recommends a maximum benefit based
on "median or average market rent for a unit of an appropriate size for each type of
household, ' 41 and annual reapplication to ensure continuing housing needs and
income eligibility.42
The report recommends the shelter-allowance program be delivered by the provincial
government, since it is an income transfer similar to other provincial social-assistance
programs. Shelter allowances are now delivered by four other Canadian provinces,
and are said to "fit within the declared priorities of the [Ontario] government. '43
Not mentioned by the report, but mitigating in favour of provincial spending of this
type, is that a high portion of provincial revenue is collected from personal income
taxes,44 which are highly biased in favour of homeowners as opposed to renters. Rent
subsidies would to some degree help correct tax inequities between homeowners and
renters.
2. Federal Capital Funding of Social Housing
The Golden Report recommends that "the federal government should provide up to
$300 million in capital support for new low-income housing" and "should also reinvest
in housing each year the savings to be realized from devolution to the provinces." 45
These recommendations are consistent with the historical role of the federal govern-
ment in the area of social housing.
Federal housing policy is delivered primarily under the National Housing Act through
a Crown corporation, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. The Golden
Report notes the declining federal commitment to social housing:
CMHC currently spends $1.9 billion a year on social housing, which is offset by
about $900 million in capital and interest payments for old loans the government
made to CMHC. This results in a net federal treasury cost of $1 billion. A rising
share of CMHC spending is the recycling of old loans as borrowers repay... 46
Grants or interest-free loans to new housing in the range of $20,000 to $50,000 a
unit (depending on the size of the unit) are needed. This type of federal support is
consistent with the current devolution to the provinces of program administration
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid at 84.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid. at 85.
44. See, for example, Peter W. Hogg & Joanne E. Magee, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 2nd
ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 36.
45. Supra note 1 at 154, recommendation 84.
46. Ibid. at 154, note 28.
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for social housing. The federal government would not be administering programs
but would be reinvesting savings it realized during the 1990's and the savings that
will accrue after devolution to the provinces.
Under the housing agreements being signed between CMHC and the provinces, the
federal subsidy will gradually decline to zero over the next 30 to 40 years as
existing project agreements expire. This means the federal government will save a
total of $600 million in Ontario by the end of that period.47
Restored federal program spending on social housing is necessary to offset huge tax
preferences to taxpayers who own and occupy their own homes, and to restore some
semblance of tax equity to the income tax system.
Ill. WHAT'S TAX GOT TO DO WITH IT?
A. The Owner-Occupied Home: A "Great Canadian Tax Shelter"
The Income Tax Act 48 affords an overwhelming tax preference for owner-occupied
housing. Investment in a home is well recognized by tax planners as one of the
most widely used and effective tax-free savings vehicles available to Canadian
taxpayers. At the 1992 national conference of the Canadian Tax Foundation,
Rodney Bergen said,
- The longstanding exemption from income tax of the gain on the sale of a principal
residence is one of the linchpins of the Canadian tax system. Along with the regis-
tered retirement savings plan (RRSP), the principal residence stands as one of the
great Canadian tax shelters. 49
The value of the home as a tax shelter is twofold. First, "the return on investment, in
the form of a shelter is not taxable." Second, "and most significantly, the capital gains
realized upon disposition of the home is exempt from taxation by virtue of the existing
provision governing the capital gains exemption on principal residence." 50
47. Ibid. at 154.
48. R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), as am.
49. Rodney C. Bergen, "'he Tax Treatment of Principal Residences: An Update" in Report of the
Forty-Third Tax Conference: 1992 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1993) at
12:1.
50. Anne-Marie Boucher, "L'Exemption du gain en capital pour residence principal" (1996) 44(2) Can.
Tax J. 348 at 348. See also Patricia Fulton, "Tax Preferences for Housing: Is There a Case for
Reform?" in Wayne R. Thirsk and John Whalley, eds., Tax Policy Options for the 1980s, Canadian
Tax Paper No. 66 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1982) (for the preferential treatment of
owner-occupied housing and the inequity and allocative inefficiency of the status quo); Peter W.
Salsich, Jr., "A Decent Home for Every American: Can the 1949 Goal Be Met?" (1993) 71 N. Car.
L. Rev. 1619 at 1627 (for tax subsidies for middle and upper income earners); Edward Yorio,
"Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986" (1987) 55 Fordham L. Rev. 395 at 395 (for
the inequity and inefficiency of the failure of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code to tax imputed rental
income); and Cushing Dolbeare, "How the Income Tax System Subsidizes Housing For the Afflu-
ent" in Rachel G. Bratt, Chester Hartman, and Ann Meyerson, eds., Critical Perspectives on Housing
(1986) at 264 (criticizing tax subsidies for homeownership on equity grounds).
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A tax-policy analysis will show that the tax preferences for owner-occupied housing
are grossly inequitable, to the advantage of homeowners and disadvantage of renters.
If the existing tax preferences are to remain, then the fundamental objectives of the
tax system, and the usual criteria for evaluating pure-tax provisions and tax expendi-
tures would call for compensating policy instruments along the lines of the direct
expenditure programs recommended by the Golden Report.
B. The Fundamental Objectives of the Tax System
The underlying objective of taxation is to raise revenue. 51 However, the objectives
any system of taxation should serve and the principles it should follow in the course
of raising revenue have been the subject of much scholarly debate.
The Royal Commission on Taxation 52 (commonly known as the "Carter Commis-
sion") was completed in 1966, and its report is the seminal work on tax policy for
Canada. It has always been widely acknowledged for its depth of analysis. For
example, shortly after the Report was issued, Boris Bittker, even in criticizing it, noted
that the Report "has few peers among modem proposals for tax reform," and belongs
in "select company."'53 He also said,
for the foreseeable future, the Report will be a starting point for any responsible
program of income tax reform in an industrialized country, as well as a prod to the
re-examination of many issues, theoretical and practical, in the taxation of income.
It has already evoked the attention of may commentators who, whatever their sepa-
rate orientation and reservation, have paid tribute to the Report's importance. 54
The Royal Commission found that
four fundamental objectives [of the tax system] on which the Canadian people agree
are: (1) to maximize the current and future output of goods and services desired by
Canadians; (2) to ensure that this flow of goods and services is distributed equitably
51. See, for example, Hogg and Magee, supra note 44 at 35, as follows: "The purpose of the income tax
is to raise revenue to finance government spending," and at 36, as follows: "Given that the main
purpose of the income tax is to raise revenue, the question arises what subsidiary objectives should
be served by the tax system" [emphasis added]. While these statements are undoubtedly correct at
present in Canada, given the financial obligations of the federal and provincial governments and the
vital importance of income-tax revenue, it is not apparent to this author whether on first principles
this must always be so. Robin Hood, for example, implemented what might be thought of as a
rudimentary tax system that was entirely revenue-neutral but intended to achieve a more just distri-
bution of wealth. Robin Hood's "tax" was admittedly a bit arbitrary in its application (although left
long enough, perhaps every fictional upper-quintile taxpayer could have been reached) and undoubt-
edly lead to some horizontal inequity, but it probably improved the overall distribution of wealth
systemwide. While this facetious example is indeed quite spurious, it would not be hard to conceive
a more revenue-neutral tax system designed primarily to redress the growing inequality of income
distribution, with overall positive effects.
52. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966).
53. Boris I. Bittker, "Income Tax Reform in Canada: The Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation"
(1968) 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 637 at 637-38.
54. Ibid. at 638.
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among individuals or groups; (3) to protect the liberties and rights of individuals
...; and, (4) to maintain and strengthen the Canadian federation. 55
This view of the underlying role of taxation is consistent with legal and economic
scholarship that both preceded and followed it to date. For example, Neil Brooks wrote
in 1993 that a wide range of international studies suggest that
the tax system is seen as basically a policy instrument with which the government
pursues its ultimate economic objectives of: (1) reallocating resources, primarily by
providing goods and services that the market cannot provide efficiently, (2) redis-
tributing income in a way that is more socially acceptable than that which results
solely from market forces, (3) stabilizing the economy near full employment and a
zero rate of inflation, and (4) encouraging economic growth.56
Similarly, Professors Boadway and Kitchen held that:
the tax system is designed to fulfil two main functions. First, taxes are levied to
finance public sector expenditures on goods and services at all levels of govem-
ment. Second, taxes are used to facilitate the transfer of purchasing power among
individuals in society and among levels of government with a view towards improv-
ing the distribution of income and wealth,57
and then stated widely accepted tax criteria of "equity, efficiency, economic growth,
stabilizing ability, effect on economic growth, and ease of administration and collec-
tion for taxpayers and governments."5 8 Of interest to this discussion is that virtually
every description of the fundamental underlying objectives of the tax system includes
significant reference to a just and equitable distribution of wealth.
C. The Priority of Tax Equity
Simons noted in prefacing his classic text, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition
of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy,
Taxation is the proper means for mitigating inequality; and, confining attention to
this field of economic policy, -one naturally places more emphasis upon that objec-
tive than would be appropriate in a less restricted discussion.59
The Royal Commission weighed the competing objectives of the tax system, and on
a general basis attached the highest priority to that of tax equity:
We assign a higher priority to the objective of equity than to all the others ... We
are convinced that unless this objective is achieved to.a high degree all other
55. Supra note 52 at vol. 1, 17.
56. Neil Brooks, 'he Changing Structure of the Canadian Tax System: Accommodating the Rich"
(1993) 31 Osgoode HalL. Rev. 138 at 140-41.
57. Robin W. Boadway and Harry M. Kitchen, Canadian Tax Policy, 2d ed., Canadian Tax Paper No. 76
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1984) at 1.
58. Ibid. at 7.
59. Simons, supra note 6, at Part V.
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achievements are of little account. Thus the need for an equitable tax system has
been our major concern and has guided us in all our deliberations. 60
Recently, Professors Hogg and Magee concurred with this finding, stating that "the
Carter Commission took the view, which is still widely shared, that equity (or fairness)
should be the major subsidiary objective of the income tax system."'61
Recalling Pigou's comments about housing at the 1914 Warburton Lecture, on the
need everywhere for "some system of standards," one would think that in Canada
everyone should have the means to meet basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing,
transportation, and education. The systemic failure of large sections of our population
to meet any of these needs is an indictment of our use of the policy instruments that
could address the distribution of wealth.
Income tax is the main policy instrument that could address the distribution of wealth
and must come under special scrutiny for its present effects on poverty and homeless-
ness and for the role it could fulfill.
D. Criteria for Evaluating Tax Provisions
The fundamental objectives of a tax system articulated in the report of the Royal
Commission are expressed in widely accepted criteria for evaluating pure-tax provis-
ions. The sole purpose of pure-tax provisions is to raise revenbe according to the
fundamental objectives of the tax system. The usual criteria in evaluating pure-tax
provisions are equity, neutrality, and simplicity.62
It should be noted that many provisions of the Income Tax Act have no relation to the
commonly accepted policy principles of equity, neutrality, and simplicity that should
direct the shape of an income tax system. They are indirect spending provisions usually
known as "tax expenditures" that are not connected to the fundamental objectives of
the income tax system. They are the equivalent of direct-spending programs, which
do not bear examination according to the usual criteria of evaluating pure-tax provis-
ions. Rather, tax expenditures should be evaluated by the same criteria that would be
appropriate for a corresponding direct-spending program.
However, tax issues related to the measurement of income are pure-tax provisions that
do require some understanding of the tax concepts of equity, neutrality, and simplicity.
1. Equity
The concept of equity in tax law is no less elusive than in other areas of endeavour.
Nevertheless, excruciatingly simplistic definitions of tax equity are generally accepted
among tax authors. Contemporary definitions of tax equity resemble the Aristotelian
60. Supra note 52.
61. Supra note 44 at 38. See also Warren Grover and Frank Iacobucci, eds., Materials on Canadian
Income Tax, 4th ed. (Toronto: Richard de Boo Limited, 1980) at 152.
62. Neutrality here refers to the lack of tax-induced behaviour between economically identical alterna-
tives. It does not refer to the concept of revenue-neutrality in the revenue-raising ability of compara-
tive tax measures.
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principle of formal equality (which was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in
the interpretation of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), which is that "things
that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated
unalike in proportion to their unalikeness." 63 This principle finds expression in the
concepts of horizontal and vertical equity.
Horizontal equity is taken to mean that similarly situated taxpayers should pay similar
amounts of tax. Vertical equity means that "persons in different circumstances bear
"appropriately different" taxes."' 64
2. Neutrality
A neutral tax measure is one that will not influence individual behaviour. With a
perfectly neutral tax, no one would change his or her behaviour with the tax or without
it. An example of the most neutral tax is a poll tax, since it does not depend on any
individual behaviour and there is no opportunity for avoidance (short of leaving the
taxing jurisdiction). A non-neutral tax is one in which taxpayers have ample opportu-
nity to plan their affairs to avoid paying tax and alter individual behaviour for the
express purpose of avoiding tax liabilities.
3. Simplicity
Tax simplicity refers to ease of administration. This criterion includes concepts of
convenience, certainty, and economy in the administration of a tax advocated by Adam
Smith in the Wealth of Nations.65 A simple tax is one that can be conveniently
administered, with certainty in the incidence and calculation of the tax, and low
administration cost.
Simplicity may be the most complex of the pure-tax criteria, because it squarely
addresses sometimes irreconcilable divergence of theory and practice in the
implementation of a tax. In the measurement of income, for example, it is often
63. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 166, per McIntyre, J., citing
Joseph T. Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws" (1949) 37 Cal. L
Rev. 341, and Ethica Nichomacea, trans. W. Ross (1925) book V-3 at 1131a-6. Incidentally, one
might wonder whether the contemporary concept of tax equity is durable enough to withstand a
Charter challenge in any given situation. In adopting a purposive approach to the similar concept of
"equality" under the Charter, McIntyre, J. noted in the passage next following (at 166), with refer-
ence to the Aristotelian principle of formal equality, as follows: "mhe test as stated, however, is
seriously deficient in that it excludes any consideration of the nature of the law. If it were to be
applied literally, it could be used to justify the Nuremberg laws of Adolf Hitler. Similar treatment
was contemplated for all Jews. The similarly situated test would have justified the formalistic separate but
equal doctrine... that incidentally was still the law in the United States at the time that Professor
Tussman and J. tenBroek wrote their much cited article .. ." Within the context of the grossly
unequal treatment of homeowners and renters under the Income Tax Act, a separate enquiry might be
made into the viability of a Charter challenge of tax provisions that disadvantage renters as a discrete
and perhaps already disadvantaged group, if poverty were accepted (which it is not) as a prohibited
analagous ground of discrimination.
64. Hogg and Magee, supra note 44 at 38, with reference to the Report of the Royal Commission on
Taxation, supra note 52 at vol. 1,4-5. See also Grover and lacobucci, supra note 61 at 153.
65. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Random House, 1937) at 777-79.
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necessary to adopt a simple proxy as a substitute for an aspect of the true measure of
income, where the true measure is by definition or in practice immeasurable. 66 Ease
of administration may dictate that approximations be made with the least possible
distortion to the other criteria of equity and neutrality.
IV. THE NON-TAXATION OF IMPUTED RENTAL INCOME
Imputed income generally refers to the inclusion as income for tax purposes of amounts
that a taxpayer does not actually receive as money, but instead receives as goods or
services, including self-performed services and the use of durable goods already
owned. Imputed rental income, for an owner-occupied home, generally means the
amount that the owner would have received if the home had been rented out in an
arm's-length transaction.
The case for inclusion of imputed rental income can at first blush be somewhat
counter-intuitive, but is strongly supported on economic and tax-policy grounds. The
failure to include imputed rental income in the income tax base skews residential
housing markets with an inflated housing demand driven by tax preferences for
owner-occupied housing. It seriously disadvantages renters in comparison to home-
owners, to the point that it helps create an insurmountable barrier for entry into the housing
market by many low-income renters. The non-inclusion of imputed rental income cannot
be supported on a pure-tax policy basis, as the following analysis will show.
A., The Definition of Income
1. The Fallacy of the Transplanted Principle
The term income has many definitions and yet has been left largely undefined in
income-tax statutes. The lack of a comprehensive statutory definition left courts to
define income, and in doing so they drew on a pre-existing body of law in trusts and
estates that laid down principles to differentiate ownership of trust receipts and
disbursements as "income" or "capital." Those principles are necessary for the operation
of a trust, since ownership of the income and capital of an estate may belong to different
parties, and it is necessary to differentiate ownership of funds on a principled basis.
However, the same principles have little to do with income-tax concepts.
Trust principles were eventually transplanted into tax theory. One author noted,
an early and persistent theory identified income as the amount that the individual
could periodically spend without encroaching upon her capital. Using this approach,
British theorists became preoccupied with formulations that would tax [as income]
only the permanent yield from capital, but not the capital itself. 67
66. A proxy is something substituted as a reasonable approximation of an underlying characteristic that may
be difficult or impossible to measure directly. For example, English'landowners were once taxed on the
number of windows in the buildings they owned as an approximation of, or "proxy" for, land value.
(Unfortunately, that proxy did not meet the tax policy criterion of economic neutrality, and many build-
ings that still stand were built with too few windows, to avoid the payment of the window tax.)
67. Chancellor, infra note 74 at 576.
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The definition of income is best provided with reference to the purpose that the term
serves. The purpose of defining income in relation to income tax is to measure
economic power. Principles necessary to differentiate ownership of trust property
where the trust capital was left to one person and income to another are irrelevant to
the measurement of economic power germane to income taxation, but were nonethe-
less applied to income-tax cases by British and American courts. This caused econo-
mists such as R.M. Haig to conclude that the legal definition of income was "so narrow
and artificial as to bring about results which from the economic point of view are
certainly eccentric and in certain cases little less than absurd," 68 and to seek other
definitions of income more broadly consistent with economics and equity.69
2. The Haig-Simons Definition of Income
Henry Simons defined income as "the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights
between the beginning and end of the period in question. '' 70 This is an economic
definition often referred to as the "Haig-Simons," or the "comprehensive," "use," or
"accretion" theory of income. It is widely accepted as the point of departure in most
discussions of the appropriate income tax base. For example, William Andrews opened
his own famous article proposing an alternative consumption tax base by remarking
that
serious thought about personal income tax has come to be dominated by an ideal in
which taxable income is set equal to total personal gain or accretion, without dis-
tinctions as to source or use. It will be useful to call this ideal an accretion-type
personal income tax. 71
The Haig-Simons economic definition of income is a benchmark that the legal
definition of an income tax base should ideally seek to achieve. However, there are
several administrative difficulties in the practical application of an income tax. One
discrete set of problems in the application of the economic definition of income is
the measurement of "the value of property rights exercised in consumption," of which
imputed rental income and the value of self-performed labour are significant com-
ponents.
B. The Nature of Imputed Income
According to the Haig-Simons definition of income, all forms of consumption should
be taxable. There is considerable debate over whether income should include only
market-based transactions, or imputed income as well.
68. R.M. Haig, 'The Concept of Income: Economic and Legal Aspects" in R.M. Haig, ed., The Federal
Income Tax (New York, 1921) at 54.
69. See Grover and Iacobucci, supra note 61 at 148-51 (on the source theory of income).
70. Supra note 6 at 50.
71. William D. Andrews, "A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax" (1974) 87 Harv.
L Rev. 1113 at 1113.
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Simons discussed the problems associated with imputed income under the heading of
"income in kind."'72 Donald Marsh followed Simons's definition of income with an
article supporting the theoretical basis for inclusion of imputed income, which he
defined as follows:
Imputed income may be provisionally defined as a flow of satisfactions from dura-
ble goods owned and used by the taxpayer, or from goods and services arising out
of the personal exertions of the taxpayer on his own behalf ... Imputed income is
non-cash income or income in kind ... and its distinguishing characteristic is that it
arises outside the ordinary processes of the market.73
Thomas Chancellor correctly pointed out that income in kind is a broad term that can
include bilateral exchange transactions in which taxable benefits are exchanged but
no cash changes hands. Chancellor noted that this form of imputed income should be
taxable in the ordinary sense, and that "bilateral transactions can be properly characterized
(as producing income or not) under general income tax principles." The more limited term
imputed income is "a species of in-kind income... [and] is limited to hypothetical benefits
from self-performed services, leisure, or the use of personal assets."'74
Imputed income can arise from either (1) self-performed labour or services that, if
obtained on the open market, would have a discernible market value; or (2) the use of
durable goods that could otherwise be leased or rented, also with some market value,
free of charge to their owner. The imputed rental income of owner-occupied housing
falls squarely in the second category. The neat issue is whether imputed income should
be included in an ideal income tax base. The policy rationales on the inclusion of these
two types of imputed income are widely divergent and suggest that while imputed
income from self-performed labour need not be included, the failure to include
imputed income from the use of durable goods is highly inequitable and distorts the
income tax base. Even though the present discussion will centre on the imputed income
from durable goods, the differences between the two forms of imputed income and
the fundamental nature of each should be briefly acknowledged.
1. Self-Performed Labour
Self-performed labour includes tasks that, if purchased on the open market, would
have some market value. These things could include, for example, painting one's own
house, fixing a car, or growing one's own vegetables. 75 The value of self-performed
72. Supra note 6, c. V, "Income in Kind."
73. Donald B. Marsh, "The Taxation of Imputed Rental Income" (1943) 58(4) Political Sci. Q. 514,
from excerpts quoted in Paul L. Caron, Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, eds., Federal
Income Tax Anthology (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co., 1997) at 140.
74. Thomas Chancellor, "Imputed Income and the Ideal Income Tax" (1988) 67 Ore. L Rev. 561 at 569.
75. Economists, and presumably tax theorists, would also include leisure as an activity that has an
intrinsic market value that can be measured and theoretically could be imputed to each taxpayer as an
element of taxable income. Issues concerning the measurement of imputed income of leisure and all
other self-performed services are somewhat complex and far beyond the scope of the present discus-
sion. However, they could be of vital importance to devising a more equitable measure of income for
the elderly and disabled, who are often economically disadvantaged because of an inability to carry
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labour is difficult to measure, and the administration of an income tax base that
includes such amounts would be highly intrusive and cumbersome, to say the least.
With respect to self-performed labour, Simons noted,
[The] measurement of consumption presents insuperable difficulties to achievement
of a rigorous conception of personal income.., from the point of view of equity in
taxation, the consumption of goods and services produced within the household or
individual economy presents real imponderables. Clearly inequitable results arise
whether such items are consistently included or ignored.76
As for the desirability of including this form of imputed income, Simons noted that
there is a high degree of horizontal equity in the use of self-performed labour, which
is more highly concentrated in the lower-income classes. This tends to reduce inequi-
ties within income classes, and to the extent that the exclusion from income favours
lower- over higher-income classes it promotes progressivity, which he held to be a
desirable end. Simons concluded that the non-inclusion of imputed income from
self-performed labour would cause no serious distortion of tax criteria.
2. Income from Durable Goods
It might not at first be obvious why the use of durable goods should be considered a
special case in the definition of income. Perhaps the best point of departure is to recall
that the economic definition of personal income is "the algebraic sum of (1) the market
value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store
of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.' '77 The
problem at hand focuses on the measurement of consumption. Usually, the purchase
price of goods is a reasonably accurate proxy for the measurement of consumption.
However, where the goods purchased are not fully consumed within a single taxation
year, the proxy breaks down, because the value of such durable goods continues to be
consumed in subsequent taxation periods. Unlike perishable goods, whose value is
used up and entirely disposed of within a single taxation period, durable goods may
even appreciate in value (and never be used up), thereby increasing the flow of benefits
to their owners in each passing year.
As for the measurement of consumption, Simons wrote that "consumption, presum-
ably, should be measured in terms of values at the time of consumption; but to ignore
changes in values between the time of purchase and the time of use will ordinarily
make very little difference."78 He acknowledged that while the purchase price of
perishable goods is usually a suitable proxy for the value of consumption, there is an
inherent error in this approximation concerning the use of durable goods, as follows:
[TIhe error involved in ignoring consumption from property varies directly with the
durability or service life of the property in question; with most foods, to take an
out many self-performed tasks that other taxpayers take for granted.
76. Supra note 6 at 110.
77. Ib at 50.
78. Ibid at 119.
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extreme case, the difference is simply negligible. In general, the disregard of
income in kind from the less durable forms of personal tangibles will occasion no
serious inequities in relative tax burdens.. .79
However, Simons also held that "serious inequity" arises from the non-inclusion of
imputed income from the consumer use of durable goods. 80
Perhaps the horizontal inequity that Simons had in mind can be demonstrated by a
taxpayer who spends, for example, a certain sum of money (in cash) on the purchase
of an expensive seaside resort exclusively for personal vacation use over the next 40
years. Had the taxpayer invested the same money in bonds, the return on the invest-
ment would be fully taxable. However, the return on the seaside resort is its annual
use as a vacation property, and is fully sheltered from tax. Therefore, the entire present
value of the seaside resort is available for consumption on vacations, without any
payment of tax on the benefits that flow from the property.
Had the same taxpayer taken the identical sum of money and, instead of spending it
at once on a capital asset that gives a return "in kind," meted out the entire amount
year by year over the next 40 years on annual vacations abroad, tax would be paid on
the income earned on the amount saved for future vacations. The traveller would then
have to divide the present value of the money between the payment of income taxes
and future consumption on vacations, and would be disadvantaged in comparison to
the seaside resort owner, whose annual return on investment is entirely tax-free. There
are unequal tax burdens borne by taxpayers who buy a capital asset that gives benefits
"in kind" in comparison to other taxpayers with different consumption tastes and
preferences. Presumably, an equitable and neutral income tax base should be indifferent
between the two forms of consumption, and should not for tax-avoidance reasons induce
the purchase of capital assets as a less expensive method of similar consumption.
Simons noted that the same considerations that tend towards exclusion of self-per-
formed labour support the inclusion of imputed income from durable goods, as
follows:
Income from consumers' capital is often a large part of total income for individuals
in the upper brackets. To exclude it is to introduce a bias inconsistent with progres-
sion and to differentiate flagrantly among persons of really similar financial circum-
stances. Furthermore, where such income is excluded, an attractive and easy means
of evasion is made available...
Serious inequity arises, furthermore, from the fact that the opportunity for evasion is
open to different income classes, on very different terms. If consumers' capital
provided a relatively uniform percentage of true income among persons of the same
income class, and if the amount or percentage of such property income increased in
fairly continuous manner from one income class to the next above, then adjustment
for the exemption might be worked out merely in the scale of rates. But even the
first of these conditions is certainly not fulfilled; nor can continued exploitation of
79. Ibid.atll8-19.
80. Ibid. at 113-14.
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the opportunities for tax avoidance be expected to bring it about. The direct employ-
ment of capital is far from equally feasible-for different kinds of consumption or for
different people with similar consumption tastes. . .81
In contrast to his conclusion that imputed income from self-performed labour need
not be taxed, Simons held that
when property is employed directly in consumption uses, there is the strongest case
for recognizing an addition to taxable income. This is widely recognized in criti-
cism of our federal tax for its egregious discrimination between renters and home-
owners... 82
C. Imputed Rental Income
1. Conceptual Definitions of Imputed Rental Income
A common conception of imputed rental income is the notional value that an owner-
occupied home would produce if let out to a third party in a market transaction. A
better way to describe it may be the market value of the use and occupancy of a home
for any period of time. This latter concept focuses better on the true nature of use and
occupancy, which is the consumption of the right of exclusive or quiet possession of
real estate for any period of time. Occupancy measured over time is a true consumer
good in the classic sense, because once it is consumed for the time in question it has
been forever lost and for that time period cannot be consumed again. Further occu-
pancy for some other period of time is another product that could be used by another
consumer.
The question here is whether imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing
should be included in the tax base. Imputed income is not included in the income tax
base in either Canada or the United States. Whether it should be included in the tax
base is a pure-tax issue entirely concerned with the measurement of income, and
should be evaluated on the criteria of equity, neutrality, and simplicity.
Distortions of both equity and neutrality from the non-taxation of imputed rental
income are concisely demonstrated by the following example given by Marsh:
A taxpayer who has acquired the sum of $20,000 (after payment of income tax) has
the choice (among other, but similar, alternatives) of (1) investing the sum in, say
five per cent bonds, collecting $1,000 and spending the interest income left, after
payment of income tax, on house rent; or, (2) investing the $20,000 in a house, in
which case he receives his rental services directly. If the tax is flat 20 per cent with
no exemptions, the first alternative leaves $800 for rent. The second alternative
would yield rental services to the full value of $1,000 yearly, since the homeowner
pays, under our statute, no tax upon his imputed income.83
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid. at 112.
83. Supra note 73 at 140-41. See also Harry Kitchen, "Imputed Rent on Owner-Occupied Dwellings"
(1967) 15 Can. Tax J. 482 at 483-84; and Fulton, supra note at 79-80, for similar but more detailed
examples of horizontal inequity.
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2. Net Imputed Rental Income
Ideally, tax consequences should be completely indifferent to the use of a home as an
owner-occupied dwelling, or as rental accommodation. It is already the case that
residential landlords are taxed only on the net profit (or loss) of investment property.
If the full value of imputed rental income were included as income for owner-occupied
homes, it would then be necessary to treat owner-occupied housing identically to rental
housing with respect to the deductibility of expenses, in order to maintain equity and
neutrality. All of the expenses that a landlord presently deducts in calculating net rental
income should also be available to owners occupying their own homes, since as
Patricia Fulton points out, "imputed net rental income is the gross rental value of an
owner-occupied dwelling, less the homeownership expenses of mortgage interest,
property taxes, maintenance and repairs. '' 84 Omitted from this list is a capital cost
allowance, which should also be afforded to maintain neutrality.
It also follows that net investment losses incurred from owner-occupied housing
should also be deductible as they are incurred, provided only that the proxy used for
measuring the market value of occupancy is fair and reasonable, and that the losses
are therefore not artificial. This too would be comparable to rental housing, which
may well incur a loss while there is little equity in the property.
D. Issues Concerning the Inclusion of Imputed Rental Income
1. Double Taxation
One argument against the inclusion of imputed rental income is that it represents
double taxation. In an article challenging the theoretical basis of the inclusion of
imputed income of all types, Chancellor argues that
under the "consumption is income" formulation the purchase of the consumer dura-
ble should be included in the tax base as consumption either when purchased or as it
is used up over its useful life. Thus, the purchase price of a house, for example,
could be taxed as consumption in the year purchased or over the period that is it is
used in consumption, but not both .. . If the asserted justification for taxing imputed
rent is that consumption is income, then including in income any amount in addition
to the cost of the house would be a second tax on the same consumption. Thus, the
"consumption is income" thesis does not justify taxing imputed rent if the funds
used to by the house were included in the tax base. 85
The double-taxation argument ignores the fact that accumulated capital for all other
forms of investment may come from the use of after-tax funds. In Marsh's example,
it would be highly unexpected that the taxpayer who invested $20,000 after-tax dollars
should not have to pay tax on the interest earned from a bond, because tax was paid
on the income earned to buy the bond itself.
The double-taxation argument also ignores the possibility that capital invested in any
way may derive from an untaxed source, such as an inheritance or windfall. To
84. Fulton, ibidL at 74.
85. Supra note 74 at 603-4.
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maintain consistency, it would then become necessary to inquire into the source of
invested capital to determine whether tax on the return on investment is double
taxation or not. This type of inquiry would predictably lead to absurd and completely
unadministrable results, in that objectively identical investments would be taxable or not,
depending on the individual source of invested capital. The only theoretically consistent
principle possible is that the return on investments of any kind is included in income,
regardless of whether or not the source of the accumulated capital was taxed.
Further, Chancellor's argument rests on an unfounded assumption that the acquisition
of a home derives from a market transaction where "the funds used to buy the house
were included in the tax base."' 86 Chancellor incorrectly refers to this as an implicit
assumption of those advocating for the inclusion of imputed income, when in fact no
such assumption can be made. A home itself, or part or the entire purchase price, may
derive from an inheritance or another untaxed source. Even if the concept of double
taxation were otherwise sound (which it is not), the assumption that a first tax was
paid is not consistently justified. In cases where untaxed sources were used to acquire
a home, the argument of double taxation must completely fail.
2. Simultaneous Consumption and Investment
Another argument against the inclusion of imputed rental income is that it is artificial
and inconsistent to characterize homeowners as both investor and consumer in relation
to the same asset. Chancellor noted that characterizing
the purchase of owner-occupied housing, and other consumer durables, as an invest-
ment rather than consumption. . . leads to an artificial construct-the homeowner
as a landlord renting the property to herself as a tenant ... Through this artifice, the
asset is shifted from the category of consumption to the category of investment to
create additional imputed investment income. To simultaneously treat a consumer
asset as both consumption and investment is inappropriate. 87 .
In a footnote to this passage, Chancellor correctly noted that in examining other
definitions of income and their limitations, Simons had earlier found that
the whole distinction between consumption and saving may well be expressed in
terms not of individual purpose but rather of social consequences of different employ-
ments of purchasing power. One tends to conserve and augment productive capac-
ity; the other involves loss and destruction of economic goods.88
The root of this objection is expressed in a question: "Can the use of a home be both
consumption and investment at once?"
In reality, people do think of homes as investments. Certainly a home has considerable
value that often increases over time (although, as with many investments, its value
admittedly may also decrease). The essential characteristic of an investment is that it
returns something of value to the owner, and the owner-occupied housing does this
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid. at 604.
88. Supra note 6 at 96.
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both in the form of shelter and in the form of appreciable capital property. At the same
time, there is, in reality, a consumption element to housing.
Homeownership has many features, and to understand how the dual reality of invest-
ment and consumption from homeownership may arise, it is useful here to examine
the smaller components of both the physical assets and the property rights (including
the right to convey and to enjoy quiet possession) involved in homeownership. The
physical assets consist of land and buildings. There are many property rights bound
up in the fee simple to real estate, which include the right to convey (or to sell the
property), and the right to enjoy quiet possession (or to have the use and occupancy
of the property). The use of these different property rights may not be evaluated along
a single dimension.
The value of land on which a home is built is a property right not capable of consumption
in the ordinary sense of being used up to the extent that it is not capable of any further
use. Consumption, with respect to land, can mean the right of use and occupancy over
time. In this sense, it is not the least inconsistent to characterize a land owner
occupying his own land as both consumer of the temporal value of occupation and
investor in the capital value of the land, at once.
Buildings resemble land in that they too have a consumption value in the right of use
and occupancy over time, but are different in that the building may well depreciate
and be consumed even to the point of expiry. If both investment and consumption
aspects on homes were taxed, any losses due to capital depreciation of the building
would be entirely accommodated by allowing a capital cost allowance, and a deduction
for capital losses on the sale of a principal residence. The temporal right of use and
occupancy is a separate and distinct "right exercised in consumption," which is also
completely consistent to include in the tax base, despite any possible depreciation in
the capital value of the asset.
Therefore, treatment of a homeowner as both consumer and investor is not an artificial
construct, but rather is both appropriate and necessary to reflect different aspects of
investment and consumption. It is entirely mistaken and incorrect to reduce a multi-
faceted property right to a single dimension, as Chancellor attempts to do.
3. Taxing Potential Income
Chancellor held that the inclusion of imputed rental income would amount to taxing
"potential rental income," and that
taxing economic potential rather than actual economic outcomes ... is objection-
able in a democratic society. The taxation of potential earning power would do
violence to our cherished notion of personal autonomy. Individuals should be free to
decide how much they will work and how much income they will have. Therefore,
any definition of income which permits taxing potential income should not be
permitted.89
89. Supra note 74 at 604-5.
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This argument is specious, since it fails to recognize the "actual economic outcomes"
of homeownership. The right to use and occupy a home is a property right "exercised
in consumption," and is separate and distinct from ownership of the home. Should a
taxpayer obtain the right of occupancy by purchasing it for a fixed period of time, it
would be called a lease, and there is no question that the market value of that
transaction would be taxed. Should a taxpayer alternatively obtain the right to use and
occupy a home by an outright purchase of title to the property, the actual economic
outcome is also that there is identical consumption of the right to use and occupy,
which should also be taxed. It would be illogical that consumption of the right to use
and occupy a home over any period of time (since it is a temporal right) should be
sheltered from tax merely because the occupier also enjoys other property rights in
the same home, such as the right to convey, which are investments not capable of
consumption.
4. Liquidity
Liquidity refers to the fact that in any individual case, a taxpayer may be asset rich
and cash poor. With many assets, it would not be at all distressing to suggest that a
taxpayer who cannot meet the carrying costs of the asset should sell it and liquidate
his or her investment. However, this is not true for a principal residence. Homeowner-
ship is generally perceived to be a societal good, and the notion that a taxpayer should
be forced to sell his or her home to meet tax liabilities from imputed rental income
would generally be thought to be unacceptable. This issue may in fact be the greatest
single deterrent to the taxation of imputed rental income.
The liquidity problem has special importance for the elderly and the disabled, who
already face the same issue in payment of municipal property taxes. The additional
burden of paying income tax on the occupancy value of the home would be well
beyond the means of many low-income groups. 90 However, this aspect might bring
into focus that the problem with liquidity is not a pure-tax issue, but an income-dis-
tribution issue. The problem with liquidity does not in any way diminish the tax equity
or neutrality of taxing imputed rental income. Rather, it identifies and highlights the
fact that large segments of our society do not have enough income to pay the true
market value of home occupancy costs. Those who own homes or have access to social
housing are to some degree sheltered from this adverse effect of inadequate income
distribution. Those who can neither afford market occupancy costs nor have non-mar-
ket access to shelter are at present completely marginalized. The very problem is that
this marginalized group is growing at an unacceptable rate.
In the view of this author, the correct answer to the liquidity problem is to squarely
address the general question of poverty and income distribution, or to create some
proxy that will practically alleviate the need for additional income specifically in the
area of shelter. The first approach would be achieved by use of a negative income tax,
discussed below. The second approach is reflected in the recommendations of the
90. See Lawrence B. Smith, "Comment [on Fulton]" in Thirsk and Whalley, supra note 50 at 97.
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Golden Report, which are also discussed below for their suitability as minimally
acceptable proxies for a more equitable, neutral, and simple income tax system.
In any case, the incorrect answer to the problem of liquidity would to continue the
present distortions to the tax base caused by the non-taxation of imputed rental income.
This is the very cause of the "egregious discrimination between renters and homeown-
ers"91 noted by Simons. The violations of equity and neutrality, as well as the
deterioration of the income tax base here occasioned may well be a significant
causative factor in the present housing crisis, and it is illogical to treat the symptoms
without at least acknowledging (if not correcting) the cause.
5. Capitalized Tax Advantages
Chancellor noted that the markets for rental and owner-occupied residential housing
"cannot be isolated," and that
because imputed rent from homeownership is not taxed, an owner-occupier will pay
more for a given house than a taxpayer who will be an owner-landlord. Owner-
occupiers will bid up the price of new and existing single-family housing well
beyond the level that could be justified as an investment. Over time, single family
residences would be owned by owner-occupiers rather than owner-landlords. 92
This anticipated effect is commonly known as a capitalized tax advantage.
The extent to which capitalized tax advantages for owner-occupied housing (deriving
from both the non-taxation of imputed rental income, and the capital-gains principal-
residence exemption) may have affected housing costs is a purely empirical question,
the analysis of which is beyond the scope of the present enquiry.93 For the sake of the
present argument, it is enough to know that an upward effect on housing costs would
be anticipated from the tax advantage of non-taxation of imputed rental income.
The adage that "an old tax is a good tax" holds where the repeal of tax advantages
would disadvantage taxpayers who have ordered their affairs in the open market
according to then-existing tax rules. In the case of owner-occupied housing, the
taxation of imputed rental income would have the anticipated effect of deflating house
prices and adversely affecting the value of the single largest investment owned my
many middle- and lower-middle-class taxpayers.
However, that one-time adjustment might also be compared to the social cost of
continuing tax incentives, which predictably inflate housing costs, in turn deepening
divisions between the economically advantaged and disadvantaged in our society.
Perhaps at some time a demarcation must be drawn between the interests of home-
owners and renters, and the economic classes that largely populate those groups. The
present housing crisis tends to favour restoring tax equity and neutrality between
homeowners and renters, even at the cost of disadvantaging the investment interests
91. Loc. cit. note 82.
92. Supra note 74 at 607.
93. This author has not been able to find any statistical data on this issue, whether through faulty
research or by virtue of the possibility that no widely available published data exists.
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of homeowners. Should house prices fall if imputed rental income were taxed, that in
itself would be a social good, which would not only be more consistent with basic tax
theory, but would help overcome the present housing crisis.
E. Evaluating the Non-Inclusion of Imputed Rental Income on Pure-Tax
Criteria
1. Equity
The present non-taxation of imputed rental income is both horizontally and vertically
inequitable, and is the cause of "egregious discrimination between renters and home-
owners" noted by Simons. 94
The resulting horizontal inequity is unacceptable, because it discriminates against
those who for reasons of transience (perhaps even for employment purposes) or other
personal circumstances prefer to rent rather than own their homes for any period of time.
The vertical equity occasioned is worse yet, because of the high degree of homeowner-
ship among all income classes, except for those in the bottom quintile of income
earners (such as single mothers under age 25 with an incidence of poverty of 83% in
Toronto) who are excluded from the housing market for lack of financial resources.
While this tax preference probably does help the majority of Canadian taxpayers, it
certainly marginalizes the poorest of the poor, who are the group now most likely to
find themselves homeless. A rising tide raises all boats, so the saying goes. The caveat
is that the tide raises only boats that still float. Boats that have already sunk stay at the
bottom, no matter how high the tide gets, and in fact the rising tide only puts them
farther under water. Such is the case of the "have nots" in Toronto, who cannot buy
into the tax preferences given to homeowners, and this lack of tax equity may in large
measure explain why they are now in increasing numbers living in hostels and on the
streets.
Theoretically, inclusion of both the full market value of the occupancy cost of
owner-occupied housing and the deductibility of expenses identically with owner
landlords would somewhat widen the tax base, and achieve both horizontal and vertical
equity. A new homeowner with little equity would likely have little change in tax
liability if purchasing a home similar to that previously rented, with carrying costs
(not including the principal component of monthly mortgage payments, which would
be a non-deductible savings or investment contribution) similar to rent. Homeowners
with unencumbered homes, who enjoy more wealth, would pay more tax. This result
closely resembles Simons's definition of income, in that the growth of equity in the
asset is a "change in value of the store of property rights," and should yield gradually
increased income in kind (in the form of shelter) as equity is accumulated. The result
is extraordinarily simple in this respect, since the declining amount of mortgage
interest actually paid in a year is directly proportional to the growth of equity in the
home, and is not susceptible to evasion. It captures the return on paid capital in the
home, while not taxing what is not intended to be taxed.
94. Loc. cit. note 82.
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2. Neutrality
Fulton persuasively noted that the lack of neutrality in the non-taxation of imputed
income leads to allocative inefficiency:
The exemption of imputed net rental income amounts to a price subsidy in the form
of a tax saving to homeowners. The non-taxation of homeowner capital gains fur-
ther reduces the cost of housing services. The direct economic effect is to reduce the
relative price of housing services to homeowners. This increases the demand for
homeownership relative to rental housing; it also increases the overall demand for
housing by encouraging investment in more valuable homes and the consumption of
a higher level of housing services. The result is a high and rising incidence of
homeownership among all Canadians ...
To a certain extent, the incidence of homeownership and the associated level of
consumption of housing services may be viewed as over-investment in housing
induced by homeowner preferences in the tax structure. The level of consumption is
inefficient.. .95
Chancellor also noted that "the failure to tax imputed rent changes the equilibrium
that would otherwise exist between consumer assets and investment assets in a non-tax
world,"96 but dismisses this criterion as irrelevant once an income tax base has been
chosen, since "an acknowledged feature of an income tax it that it encourages
consumption over investment. '97
To the contrary; allocative efficiency is entirely relevant. It is synonymous with the
generally accepted criteria of tax neutrality, which was expressly adopted as one of
the fundamental objectives of the tax system by the Royal Commission on Taxation.
Acknowledgement that income tax encourages consumption over investment is to
merely notice that the current law does not adequately define the income tax base. If
better proxies for Simons' definition of income as "the market value of rights exercised
in consumption, and the change in the value of the store of property rights" were
adopted, then ideally an income tax would be neutral between consumption and
investment. Chancellor posed the rhetorical question, "Does this [lack of allocative
efficiency] justify taxing imputed rent?" The answer given here is that it does. This is
particularly so because each of the other arguments made against imputed rental
income inclusion is completely without merit. Maintaining allocative efficiency would
at least promote one of the basic tenets of tax theory: neutrality.
3. Simplicity
Simons anticipated some administrative difficulties in the taxation of imputed rental
income, but nothing of the sort that would make it at all impractical or inadvisable.98
Other authors, such as Kitchen, anticipate that the inclusion of imputed rental income
"presents a more formidable barrier to its inclusion in the income tax base" in relation
95. Supra note 50 at 83-84.
96. Supra note 74 at 607-8.
97. Ibid. at 608.
98. Supranote6 at 116-18.
(2001) 16 Journal of Law and Social Policy
to the calculation of deductible expenses, and the "determination of gross rental
value," which problems they present in far greater detail than that disclosed here.99
In the view of this author, far too much is made of the complexities associated with
taxing imputed rental income. The essential task is to attribute a fair market value to
the use and occupancy of land, which is tied to land value. The material fact, from an
administrative standpoint, is that throughout Canada we already use the assessed value
of real estate as a municipal property tax base, and now at least in Ontario for
provincial tax purposes as well.
Conceptually,in order to estimate the market value of the use and occupancy of land,
all that need be done is to assess the fair market value of land, and then attribute a
fixed uniform percentage of that value as an approximation of the market value of its
use and occupation. This amount would be included by default as a minimum amount
in the absence of any other greater income inclusion. 100 Taxpayers would then deduct
actual expenses, whether owner-occupier or owner-landlord, on an identical basis as
is already the case without undue administrative burdens for landlords.
The complexities of assessing property values cannot be underestimated. Despite that,
in Ontario we presently have a province-wide property tax base with enough consistency
between municipalities to fund education costs province-wide. The task, although diffi-
cult and complex, is certainly administratively feasible. Having already assembled a
property tax base that is currently assessed based on fair market values (or "current
value assessment") in Ontario for other purposes, it would take minimal administration
cost to fix a percentage of the assessed value of property as an imputed occupancy
value for inclusion in income, in the absence of any other revenue stream from that
property.
Admittedly, no enquiry is made here into the strengths and weaknesses of the existing
assessed property tax bases in other provinces. Municipal property taxes are collected
in every province, and it may well be that substantial improvements must be made to
methods of assessment in some provinces to adequately assess income-tax liabilities.
The fact remains that in all parts of Canada we already venture into the area of
assessing tax liabilities based on the value of real property, and to use that existing tax
base for an additional purpose would not be a radical departure. Rather, the use of the
same tax base for more than one purpose may have the desirable effect of efficiently
pooling resources to do a better job of property assessment for all tax purposes, to the
benefit of all taxpayers.' 01 Simons considered this possibility, and found that
99. Supra note 83 at 484-85.
100. Using a percentage of property value as a minimum inclusion is a simple anti-avoidance mechanism,
which averts inquiries into whether transactions are arm's length or not. A similar device is presently
used on the collection of retail sales tax and G.S.T. on the sales of used automobiles at the time of
registration in Ontario, for example.
101. It should also be noted here that using the same property tax base twice will not place additional
taxes on all taxpayers. Owners of investment real estate would not pay any additional tax, since their
actual rent receipts are already included in income. The dual use of the same tax base would only
increase equity and neutrality throughout by fairly estimating the consumption value of the use and
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to be sure, the property must be valued; but assessments must be made in any event
for purposes of other levies. If this work is badly done under the property taxes, we
need not be reconciled to indefinite continuance of present conditions of administra-
tion; and the general program of co-operation between the tax-administering agen-
cies of the federal, state, and local governments has much to commend it. If federal
officials had need of good assessments on residence properties, income-tax collec-
tion might become more costly for a time. But their activities might contribute
greatly toward improvement of state and local administration.. 102
F. Negative Income Taxes and Refundable Tax Credits
The particular virtue of a negative income tax, or more limited programs of refundable
tax credits, is that it could overcome the problems of liquidity inherent in the taxation
of imputed rental income, and at the same time provide a more adequate general
response to poverty. The use of a negative income tax is suggested here as a superior
integrated approach to accommodating the taxation of imputed rental income, and
income redistribution to the point that other more specific housing interventions might
be averted. At the same time, the use of this type of policy instrument would enhance
the fundamental tax criteria of equity, neutrality, and simplicity.
1. A Universal Response to the Inequitable Distribution of Income
At this juncture, it is useful to recall the case for housing subsidies as a remedy for
one aspect of poverty, and the divergence of approach referred to by Mason. Policy
makers may address the issue of housing through policy instruments directed to the
relief of poverty in general, or by direct interventions into the housing market.
It is here suggested that in considering the ideal or best possible results, the universal
relief of poverty is a superior response to housing affordability than other interventions
that leave grossly inequitable distributions of income and high levels of poverty in
place. This approach appears to be consistent with the thoughts of Claudette Bradshaw,
federal Co-ordinator on Homelessness, who in private correspondence to this author
said, "The Government of Canada is working on a variety of fronts to address the
longer-term issue of poverty so that homelessness does not become a consideration
for Canadians. For example, we are doing everything we possibly can to help
Canadians find stable jobs so that they no longer have to live in poverty."'103
In the context of generally addressing an inequitable distribution of wealth, the use of a
negative income tax (as suggested by Mason and Schill) also comes immediately to mind.
2. Development of Negative Income Tax Programs
A comprehensive review of the negative income tax is well beyond the scope of the
present enquiry. For the purposes of this discussion, it may be enough to say that it is
occupancy of owner-occupied real estate, and even within that latter group it is those with the most
equity who have more tax burdens. The net effect would be to put all taxpayers on a more even
footing.
102. Supranote6 at 117-18.
103. Letter from Claudette Bradshaw, Minister of Labour, to Graham Webb (6 May 1999).
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an administratively convenient device that-more than any other policy instrument-
might bring about an effective redistribution of income. Certainly, the Canadian
experience with a negative income tax for seniors in the form of the Guaranteed
Income Supplement 0 4 has been highly popular and effective. Criticism of the Guar-
anteed Income Supplement is virtually unheard of and, more important, the supple-
ment is likely a significant factor in reducing the poverty rate among the elderly from
21% to 9.2% since 1980. Administration of the supplement is remarkably smooth, and
by every measure the program has been an unqualified success. Similarly, the province
of Manitoba experimented with the "Mincom" negative income tax for a limited
duration, without serious adverse results. The next question might be whether a
universal negative income tax could be a practical response to poverty throughout all.
age groups in Canada.
A brief review of literature suggests that support for a negative income tax seems to
have ripened on the vine. Milton Friedman prominently advanced the concept more
than 30 years ago,105 and the number of proposed program designs and the amount of
academic literature that followed within the next decade suggest that it may have been
viewed as a serious possibility.10 6 More recent literature on a negative income tax per
se is less common, consistent with the general competition for government spending
among different program areas in Western economies. Boadway and Kitchen seem to
have captured the present mood of policy makers towards a negative income tax by
noting in their 1984 tax paper that
while the case for [a negative income tax] is probably well accepted by economists,
there is apparently still some unease among political decision-makers about it. The
federal government's white paper on income security recommended against a uni-
versal [negative income tax] scheme to replace existing income transfers. Also, it is
certainly the case that [a negative income tax] scheme would not fulfil the social
insurance function as it would the income maintenance one...107
The same authors noted in a paper delivered at the Canadian Tax Foundation 1999 tax
policy conference that "what is surprising about the system of redistribution is that,
104. The Guaranteed Income Supplement is an income-security program administered under the Old Age
Security Act by Human Resources Development Canada, based on age (minimum age 65), immigra-
tion status (Canadian citizen or other legal immigration status), and residence (at least 10 years'
residence in Canada after the age of 18). It guarantees an annual income (for the first quarter of 1999
in the amount of $977.44 for a single person, or $1,388.67 for a married couple), and benefits are
reduced by $1 for every $2 of other income. Therefore, it comprises a negative income tax for
seniors with a 50% marginal rate.
105. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago, 1962) at 191-93.
106. See, for example, Christopher Green, Negative Income Taxes and the Poverty Problem (Washington:
Brookings Institute, 1967); James Tobin, Joseph A. Pechman, & Peter M. Mieszkowski, "Is a
Negative Income Tax Practical?" (1967) 77 Yale L J. 1; Ronald W. Crowley and David A. Dodge,
"Cost of the Guaranteed Annual Income" (1969) 17 Can. Tax J. 395; Colin J. Hindle, "Negative
Income Taxes and the Poverty Problem in Ontario" (1971) 19 Can. Tax J. 116; and Daniel P.
Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income (New York: Vintage, 1973).
107. Supra note 57 at 346.
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despite the widespread view among economists and other public policy specialists in
favour of negative income tax-type systems, transfers delivered through the tax system
have not been widely used in Canada." 108 Regardless of the merits, it certainly appears
for the present time that any sweeping income redistribution through the income-tax
system is not practically foreseeable, even though it might yield a more effective and
adequate response to poverty in general. This result tends to move the debate on
responses to housing issues from the general relief of poverty, to housing programs
of the type suggested by the Golden Report.
3. Refundable Tax Credits
While negative income taxes appear to be presently out of favour among policy
makers, the related concept of refundable tax credits that disappear as taxable income
rises to a given threshold are very much in vogue. 109 The two instruments resemble
one another to the point that it is difficult to distinguish between them, except on the
criteria that disappearing refundable tax credits serve more limited purposes and are
not generally available. The refundable tax credit is a limited application of the
negative income tax with great potential practical application.
An interesting recent development tying imputed income and negative income tax
together is the proposal by Nancy Staudt for a non-refundable household income tax
credit (HITC) resembling the American refundable employment income tax credit
(EITC), 110 which itself resembles a negative income tax. What is perhaps most
unexpected about this proposal is that it derives from a feminist perspective and is
intended to incorporate the value of women's household labour into the tax base, which
previously had not been advocated as an equality-seeking measure for women. Under
Staudt's proposal, the imputed value of household labour would be included in income,
and a corresponding tax credit would be applied to overcome the problem of liquidity
in taxing that income. Unlike the EITC, the HITC under Staudt's proposal would be
non-refundable. Further details of the proposal are not important here, except to note
that the general objective of the scheme would be to include the value of household
labour in the tax base for the express purpose of generating more equitable earning of
social security benefits for homemakers, and to generally acknowledge the high
societal value of women's work in the home.
Staudt's work is not unique and was preceded by the work of Charles O'Kelley who,
for quite different reasons, advocated a similar proposal for the taxation of the imputed
income of household services with an offsetting credit for the tax.111 Unlike Staudt,
O' Kelley was concerned with overcoming what he perceived to be a tax penalty in
108. Robin Boadway & Harry Kitchen, "Personal Income Tax Reform in a Broader Context" in 1999 Tax
Policy Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999) at 10.
109. In Canada, the Child Tax Benefit and the G.S.T. credit enjoy the endorsement of authors such as
Boadway and Kitchen (1999) ibid. at 11. The American EITC has prompted other authors to propose
similar programs for other purposes.
110. Nancy C. Staudt, 'Taxing Housework" (1996) 84 Georgetown L J. 1571 at 1536-40.
111. Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., "The Parenting Tax Penalty: A Framework for Income Tax Reform" (1986)
64 Ore. L. Rev. 375 at 389-97.
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traditional parenting relationships. The use of the same type of policy instrument for
such widely divergent purposes might incidentally demonstrate the flexibility of this
type of measure.
4. Negative Income Taxes and Refundable Tax Credits in the Taxation of Imputed
Incomes
The generic conclusion drawn here is that refundable tax credits and negative income
taxes have considerable potential for bringing more comprehensive resolutions of the
"imponderables" Simons referred to in the taxation of imputed income.
With some ingenuity, all aspects of imputed income might well be taxed in a negative
income-tax system that makes corresponding refundable tax credits available, based
on objective criteria. Such a system would yield consumer indifference between cash
expenditures and self-performed labour, since the former would be paid directly and
the latter taxed as in-kind income. This type of program would reduce the penalty
against specialization lamented by Simons, 112 and overcome many "insuperable
difficulties" for taxing a broad range of activities that have market equivalents. The
benefit of such a system, in short, is that those unable to take advantage of income in
kind, such as the infirm or disabled (with respect to housework and the activities of
daily living), working parents (with respect to child care), and renters (with respect to
accommodation) would retain the tax credits (thus forming a type of negative income
tax) but be relieved of tax liability for imputed incomes not present in the individual
case. Greater equity in the taxation of all forms of income would be achieved.
Certainly, beyond the skeletal conceptual framework here mentioned, a specific
program design would have its own considerations well beyond the scope of the
present discussion.
5. Resemblance to the Golden Report Recommendation on Provincial Shelter
Allowances
The relevance of this discussion to the Golden Report is that recommendation 38
suggesting a provincial shelter allowance has elements that resemble a refundable tax
credit or a negative income-tax design suggested above. The credit is targeted exclu-
sively at renters, so that taxation of imputed rental income is not an issue. On the
opposite side, it offers a disappearing credit based on income, which would be
delivered by the provincial government rather than through the income-tax system.
Yet, the net effect for the targeted group would be similar to taxing imputed rental
income with an offsetting refundable tax credit for reasonable housing costs. The
recommended program is if anything less generous than a universal negative income
tax might be, since it addresses only the "affordability gap" between actual rent and
112. Supra note 6 at 110. The nature of the penalty against specialization is that taxpayers that funnel all
of their productive activity into a single specialty that is sold or traded in exchange for other services
that the taxpayer could have less productively performed herself, pays tax on her full economic
output and is penalized in comparison to a taxpayer who foregoes marketable production in favour of
self-performed services. For example, if an automobile mechanic fixes more cars, and hires a painter
to paint her house, she will pay more tax than a mechanic who fixes fewer cars and paints her own
house, because self-performed labour is not included in the income tax base.
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35% of income, and 90% of the difference at that. Yet for the most marginalized group
of housing consumers, the shelter allowance conceptually resembles the net results of
what a general response to the existing tax preference for the non-taxation of imputed
income might take.
V. THE PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE EXEMPTION
A. The Principal-Residence Exemption as a Tax Expenditure
The second aspect of the tax preference for owner-occupied housing is the non-taxa-
tion of capital gains from the sale of a principal residence. This preference is far less
complex than the non-taxation of imputed income, since it is a tax expenditure and
not a taxing provision at all. It is indisputable that according to the strict application
of pure-tax criteria, the capital gains on the sale of a home would be taxed in a
benchmark tax base, and that the non-taxation of that income does form a tax
preference.
B. Criteria for Evaluating Tax Expenditures
Tax expenditures are the equivalent of direct-spending programs, and should be
evaluated as such. One difficulty in evaluating tax expenditures is that, unlike direct-
spending programs, the merits are rarely articulated and debated. In the case of the
principal-residence exemption, for example, the provision was last before the House
in the context of the 1981 federal budget, which eliminated the availability of separate
exemptions for a home and cottage owned and jointly occupied by spouses. The issue
then concerned the inequity of allowing double exemptions, without directly address-
ing the validity of the first exemption at all. It is inconceivable that a direct-spending
program would similarly escape the scrutiny of Parliament.
The merits of the principal-residence exemption are not the central focus of the present
enquiry. Of central importance is that the exemption does form a tax preference for
homeowners that serves non-tax objectives. In that sense, it distorts the pure-tax
criteria of equity, neutrality, and perhaps simplicity. Here we need only briefly
examine the policy objectives served, with particular attention to the comparative
situation of renters.
C. Purposes and Results of the Principal-Residence Exemption
In the absence of vigorous Parliamentary debate, it is useful to briefly articulate the
goals of the principal-residence exemption, and then to compare those goals to the
results of the expenditure on the same basis as would be appropriate in a direct-spend-
ing program.
The major articulated goal of the principal-residence exemption is to "encourage and
assist homeownership by Canadians."1 13 For renters, that broad purpose might be
113. See, for example, Canada, Department of Finance, 1981 Budget: The Budget in More Detail (Ottawa:
Dept. of Finance, November 12, 1981) at 38, for a brief discussion of the policy implications of the
principal residence exemption under the heading "Secondary Residential Properties," as follows:
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examined in relation to (1) how it assists renters to enter the housing market, and (2)
the degree of preference given to homeowners.
1. Assisting Renters to Enter the Housing Market
The sad fact for renters is that the principal-residence exemption offers no assistance
in entering the housing market. It is the equivalent of a direct-spending program, in
which the only qualifying criteria are that a taxpayer should buy a home of his or her
choosing (without necessary reference to housing needs), live in it, and claim no other
principal residence exemption for the same period of time, and then at the time of sale
receive a grant equal to the tax liability that would otherwise have accrued on the
capital gain. The program offers no cash assistance to first-time buyers at the time of
purchase, and may in fact form a barrier to entry to the extent that it inflates demand
for residential housing and inflates housing prices. With respect to this objective, it
would be difficult to conceive of a more inept program design.
2. The Degree of Preference Given to Homeowners
a. Larger Preferences for Larger Homes
The other remarkable feature for renters is that the principal-residence exemption
rewards opulence and penalizes frugality. Homeowners in the same tax bracket enjoy
greater tax savings in direct proportion to the value of their principal residence. If one
assumes a reasonably consistent capital gain expressed as a percentage of property
value within a single housing market for a defined period of time, the taxpayer owning
the more expensive home will realize the largest gain and thereby shelter the most
income. This penalizes a similarly situated taxpayer who buys a less valuable home
and invests the price difference in a taxable form of investment. Of course, the renter.
is completely disadvantaged in relation to both, since he or she has no gain at all to
shelter.
b. Vertical Inequity
One hardly expects a tax expenditure to be perfectly equitable in the purest sense,
since it does by definition apply non-tax criteria and distort the fundamental principles
of the tax system. Despite that, the Royal Commission on Taxation directly commented
on the equity of tax expenditures:
In our opinion, there is a consensus that the tax-expenditure mechanism (including
transfers) is equitable when it increases the flow of goods and services to those who,
because they have little economic power relative to others, or because they have partic-
ularly heavy responsibilities or obligations, would otherwise not be able to maintain a
decent standard of living... our principal concern is that the allocation of taxes, given
the existing transfer mechanism and public expenditures, should be such as to achieve
an equitable distribution of the flow of goods and services among Canadians. 114
"Capital gains on the principal residence of a taxpayer are fully exempt from tax. This exemption is
an important element of the government's social policy to encourage and assist homeownership by
Canadians... On the grounds of fairness and in order to prevent undue erosion of the tax base, this
exemption will in future be confined to only one principal residence per married couple..."
114. Supranote52at V-I, 10.
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Of particular interest to the homeless is the glaring vertical inequity of the principal-
residence deduction. There is a high incidence of homeownership across all income
classes, save and except the bottom quintile of income earners in Canada. It would be
unexpected to say the least for the federal government to propose a direct-spending
program that subsidizes housing, but gives the greatest benefits to most wealthy
participants who can afford the largest homes, and completely excludes those in the.
lowest-income groups who cannot afford to buy into the housing market. The policy
considerations that would support such a program would be rather elusive.
Exacerbating the vertical inequity of the principal-residence exemption is the upside-
down effect common to all income deductions. Assuming identical gains for taxpayers
in different tax brackets, those taxpayers in the highest tax brackets will enjoy the
greatest tax savings, and this too is a rather unsupportable result. Fulton ably expressed
the significant problems with vertical equity, as follows:
The substantial benefits to homeownership are distributed among homeowners
in accordance with the level of housing services consumed and homeowner
marginal tax rates. The value of the benefit an individual homeowner receives
depends on the homeowner's marginal tax rate and the amount by which his
housing consumption is subsidized (that is, imputed net rental income plus capi-
tal gains as a proportion of gross housing cost). Fulton and Smith have both
examined the distributive consequences of homeowner tax preferences. The results
indicate that benefits as measured by tax savings increase with income. Higher-
income homeowners derive a greater benefit than lower-income homeowners do;
and because renters are excluded, the distortion between renters and homeowners
increases with income. 115
There can be no mistaking that the application of the principal-residence exemption
is a marked departure from the principles of tax equity laid down by the Royal
Commission on Taxation.
c. Aggregate Value of the Principal-Residence Exemption
The aggregate value of the principal residence exemption for 1999 is projected to be
$1.450 billion compared to a 75% inclusion of capital gains, and $1.930 billion
compared to a full income inclusion of capital gains. The latter sum would seem to
give a fairer reflection of the principal-residence exemption, since the partial inclusion
of capital-gains income is itself a tax expenditure, and only the latter gives a true
comparison to a truly equitable and neutral tax base.
VI. THE USE OF COMPENSATING POLICY INSTRUMENTS
A. The Need for Compensating Policy Instruments
The Royal Commission recommended against the use of tax preferences in general,
but where (as in the case of the principal-residence exemption) they are to continue,
it also recommended the use of other compensating policy instruments. In Canada, tax
115. Supra note 50 at 84.
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preferences for owner-occupied housing are somewhat offset by direct-spending
programs in other areas.
B. Federal Housing Policy
Federal housing policy is delivered primarily through CMHC under the National
Housing Act. Except in relation to First Nations, the elderly, and the disabled, the
federal government has stopped funding of new social-housing units since 1993. Prior
to that change in policy, CMHC had funded a social-housing stock of more than
645,000 units under 40-year project agreements. CMHC continues to honour those
pre-existing agreements, and by doing so is no more than meeting its contractual
obligations. To enable CMHC to meet its contractual obligations, the federal govern-
ment continues to fund CMHC in the nominal amount of $1.9 billion annually, which
the Golden Report maintains "is offset by about $900 million in capital and interest
payments for old loans the government made to CMHC. This results in a net federal
treasury cost of about $1 billion. A rising share of CMC spending is the recycling of
old loans as borrowers repay... 1 16
Now, administration of the social-housing stock is being transferred from CMHC to
the provinces as funding agreements are reached, in which the existing contract
obligations continue to be funded by the federal government. 117 In the end, the present
federal commitment to social housing is a historical obligation involving no new
program spending, nor the construction of new social-housing units except in the
limited circumstances mentioned above.
In June 2000, the Government of Canada laid the cornerstone of its "action plan on
homelessness" in the form of the Supporting Communities Partnership Initiative
(SCPI). 118 SCPI is a three-year program with a total budget of $305 million to "enable
communities to bring together various partners to develop local solutions to their
homeless problems. The initiative will help communities put in place a seamless web
of supports for their homeless population." 1 9 Under SCPI, local governments are left
to devise their own homelessness action plans, and then seek funding (of up to 50%
for priority initiatives) from the federal government and other partners that may
include municipal and provincial government, the private sector, community agencies,
and charities. To date, homelessness action plans have been developed for the cities
116. Supra note 1 at .154, n. 28. See also Canada, Department of Finance, Public Accounts of Canada,
1997-98 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1998) at 20.6 (showing total program budgetary
spending for CMHC in current year of $1,863,052,805) and at 20.13 (showing total non-tax revenues
for CMHC in the current year of $620,883,626, including "return on investments-loans, invest-
ments and advances-Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation of $609,998,938).
117. See, for example, CMHC, Annual Report, 1996 (Ottawa: Canada Mortgage and Housing Corpora-
tion, 1997) at 4-5, reporting that "the orderly transfer of federal management responsibilities in social
housing" to the provinces had begun with a 1996 agreement with Saskatchewan, and the expectation
of several more provinces in 1997.
118. News Release, "Government of Canada Announces Another Step in Action Plan on Homelessness"
(2 June 2000).
119. Ibid.
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of Toronto, Calgary, Edmonton, Ottawa, Halifax and Hamilton. Vancouver has an
interim plan, and one is in development for Winnipeg. 120 (last modified: 8 March
2001). These cities are the urban areas in which homelessness is most acute.
SCPI is part of the federal government's Homelessness Initiative, first announced in
December 1999, which has a stated total budget of $753 million over three years. 121
(last modified: 15 June 2001). Beyond SCPI, other aspects of the federal government's
Homelessness Initiative include (over three years) $59 million for youth programs
under the Youth Employment Strategy; $59 million for homelessness-related projects
under the Urban Aboriginal Strategy; $268 million for the renovation or conversion
of shelters and affordable housing units under the Residential Rehabilitation Assis-
tance Program (RRAP); $43 million to expand the Shelter Enhancement Program for
shelter and second-stage housing for survivors of family violence; and $10 million
worth of surplus federal properties to alleviate homelessness. 122
The Homelessness Initiative does not fund the re-entry of the federal government into
the continual construction of new social housing for young low-income families. 123.
However, this special one-time effort is miniscule in comparison to the unmet demand
for social housing. The measures undertaken in the Homelessness Initiative are much
needed to alleviate the grave social ills that were caused by the federal government's
withdrawal from the construction of new social housing (except for the elderly,
disabled, and First Nations) in 1993. The Homelessness Initiative is structurally
deficient and practically ineffective, because it does not address the underlying
problem of the lack of affordable housing. The City of Toronto published a Report
Card on Homelessness 2000 that aptly summarized the efforts of the federal and
provincial governments in the area of homelessness, as follows:
The provincial and federal governments have each taken some action in response to
the Task Force recommendations. However, much of the response involves target-
ing funds to homelessness services. A service strategy on its own cannot solve the
problem. People need access to an adequate income, to a range of employment
opportunities, skills training and education so they can provide for themselves and
their families. And, of course, people need access to supportive and affordable
housing. 124
120. Government of Canada, "City Partners" (2001) online: <http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/nsh-snsa/cit-
ies/researchcity-e.html
121. Canada, National Homelessness Secretariat, "Partnerships to Help Canada's Homeless People (2001)
online: <http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/nsh-snsa/homepage..e.html
122. Canada, National Homelessness Secretariat, "Partnerships to Help Canada's Homeless People (2001)
online: <http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/nsh-snsa/homepage3_e.html> (last modified: 15 june 2001).
123. Special one-time funding under the RRAP program is reported by the City of Toronto, for example,
to upgrade several hundred rooms and apartment suites for low-income renters, of which "74 rooms
and 80 apartment suites were either newly created or restored": City of Toronto, "An Action Plan for
Homelessness (2001), online: <http://www.city.toronto.on.ca/homelessness/action.htm#2
124. City of Toronto, "An Action Plan for Homelessness (2001), online: <http://www.city.toronto.on.ca/
homelessness/conclusions.htm>.
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In the view of this author, the federal Homelessness Initiative is nothing more than
the food bank of social housing. It accepts and perpetuates the economic and social
conditions (including a federal income-tax policy that egregiously discriminates
against low-income renters) that overwhelmingly contribute to the condition of home-
lessness, and does nothing to correct the underlying problem of the lack of affordable
low-income housing. It attempts to alleviate and remove from public view the most
visible and worrisome symptoms of homelessness, without any reconsideration for
the major policy instruments that create and perpetuate homelessness. It soothes and
comforts the homeless with temporary shelter, but does not radically change the social
conditions that make them homeless in the first place.
C. Tax Policy and Homelessness
Even though the federal government has begun the retirement of its single major
spending program that assists the homeless and in part compensates for grossly
inequitable tax advantages given to homeowners, it has never disclosed any intention
of curbing or ending those tax advantages itself. These facts are capable of supporting
only one set of conclusions: that the present intention of the federal government is to
continue with highly inequitable tax advantages in favour of homeowners (which
additionally favour upper-income earners more than lower-income earners), without
the benefit of any compensating policy instrument specifically designed to redress
those inequities beyond what it is now retiring.
Attribution of blame for the present housing crisis is not the purpose of this discussion,
but the facts stated suggest inescapable conclusions. Every objective standard of tax
policy casts a damning indictment of the federal tax base, and of the failure of any
level of government to implement any type of compensating policy instrument to
restore the barest notion of tax equity.
VII. A SYNTHESIS OF TAX POLICIES
A. An Equitable, Neutral, and Simple Tax Policy
Applying pure-tax criteria, the most equitable, neutral, and simple method of address-
ing the present housing crisis would call for:
1. The taxation of net imputed rental income of owner-occupied housing, using a
reasonable estimation of the market value of occupancy rights (perhaps with ref-
erence to the assessed property tax base), and the deduction of expenses on a
basis identical to that presently afforded to residential landlords
2. The implementation of a negative income tax system, or in the alternative a
refundable tax credit, to address the general issues of inequitable income distri-
bution, poverty, and housing affordability, and also to overcome problems with
liquidity in the payment of tax liabilities deriving from imputed rental income
3. The repeal of the exemption for inclusion in income of capital gains on the sale
of a principal residence
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B. The Golden Report Recommendations as Suitable Proxies for a More
Fundamentally Sound Tax Policy on Housing
Since there is no suggestion from any level of government that tax inequities that
egregiously discriminate against renters and significantly contribute to homelessness
will be fundamentally remedied any time soon, it is here appropriate to turn attention
to the suitability of the Golden Report recommendations under consideration as a
suitable proxy for a more fundamentally sound tax policy on housing.
The Golden Report recommends provincially funded shelter allowances, and increased
federal government program spending for the construction of new social housing.
From a tax policy perspective, both recommendations have considerable merit.
Housing allowances on the program design recommended tend to offset the non-tax-
ation of imputed rental income, and resemble a negative income tax or refundable
tax-credit system which would be minimally necessary to overcome problems of
income distribution, housing affordability, and liquidity with respect to payment of
tax obligations arising from imputed rental income if a more fundamentally sound tax
base were implemented.
Federal capital spending on social housing in the amounts suggested is more than
offset by the principal-residence exemption, which is a significant tax preference paid
disproportionately to high-income earners, in direct contradiction to the principles of
tax equity laid down by the Royal Commission on Taxation.
Both programs are sound in program design from a tax policy standpoint. They are
remarkably modest in amount in comparison to tax advantages inequitably afforded
to higher-income groups, and fairly represent the least possible interventions available
to both senior levels of government in the rental housing market. To do less would
ignore every generally accepted principal of tax policy, and would fail to carry out a
compelling obligation of humanity.

